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Although Digital Rights Management systems were often triumphantly presented  
as a panacea for digital piracy they actually did not meet their objective. Moreover,  
number of products failed on the market because of the use of the DRM systems and  
various studies indicate that usage of such systems may indirectly act as a positive  
driver of digital piracy. With their further development DRM systems considerably  
evolved and became more sophisticated. Combating the piracy is no more their main  
aim and they became an important part of the competition strategies and business  
models of many companies. At the heart of this paper lies the question whether  
DRM technologies inherently include special characteristics which may cause that  
they act as a driver of digital piracy and whether were those characteristics identi -
fied by DRM system implementers and subsequently mirrored in further develop-
ment of current DRM systems. 
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1. DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS – BY WAY OF 
INTRODUCTION
Digital Rights Management (“DRM”) systems can be defined as a generic 
name  for  the  range  of  architectural  controls  in  software  and  hardware 
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which allow control of distribution and access to content, monitor its use 
and prevent unauthorised usage of this protected content or its usage on 
unauthorised devices.[1] However, DRM systems are often understood as 
technologies that only limit the use of digital content or devices. Such in-
sight does not take into consideration the second aspect of the Digital Rights 
Management systems, that they also provide information to the users about 
permitted uses of the content and devices and also about ownership of the 
copyright, facilitating use and clearance of rights[2]. By recognition of those 
two aspects DRM systems can be divided into two general groups:
Rights  management  systems  (or  Rights  management  information), 
which serves to the mentioned second aspect of DRM and
Technological protection measures (“TPM”), the purpose of which is to 
provide means for the owners of the copyright and related rights to prevent 
unauthorised  usage of  protected content  “by limiting  access,  copying  or 
other unauthorised actions by end users conditional on compliance with li-
censing conditions applied by the owner of rights” [3].
DRM systems can be also recognized as:
- DRM in hardware - as a part of the equipment or hardware which is  
used to play digital content[4]. The region-coding technology for DVD’s can 
serve as an example. Region code included in DVDs and also in DVD play-
ers is restricting the area of the world in which the DVDs can be played[5]. 
- DRM in software – as technologies whose purpose is to prevent copy-
ing of the content or to control or restrict certain use of protected digital me-
dia. DRM in software is used more often than DRM in hardware[6], mainly 
in connection with music and e-books. 
In the following text, the terms Digital Rights Management systems and 
Digital  Rights  Management  technologies  will  be  used  as  terms  for  both 
DRM systems  with  management  functions  and  Technological  protection 
measures, as well as DRM in hardware and also DRM in software. 
DRM systems were developed as the second modality of content protec-
tion after the first form, the law based copyright protection, failed to do it  
sufficiently. However, not even this technological protection was enough to 
bring success adequate to the amount of time and resources spent on devel-
opment and introduction of it, mainly because no DRM system is unbreak-
able - no matter how robust the technological protection is. According to the 
available scorecard from 2007 every single existing DRM system had been 
cracked[7]  and  nothing  changed  in  this  respect  until  nowadays.  Simple 
2012] R. Kutiš: DRM Systems and Digital Piracy 103
DRM systems can be broken in seconds even by very primitive means, as 
holding the shift key while inserting the CD into the CD-ROM drive[8] and 
the more complex ones can be cracked in weeks or  rarely in  months[9].  
Thus, without the legal protection against circumvention, technological pro-
tection represent only small, but costly speed bump on the digital highway 
leading to the protected content. Therefore, it was not surprising that mem-
bers of the content industry lobbied for legal protection of DRM systems 
like they successfully did before in connection with the protection of the 
cable  and  satellite  television  broadcast  scrambling  technologies[10].  Al-
though the issue of legal protection against DRM circumvention caused big 
hesitation and discrepancy between the delegates of the WIPO conference 
in Geneva, effort of the content industry was successful and it was finally 
agreed to add Articles 11 and 12 to the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty and 
Articles 18 and 19 to the 1996 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.
[11] Those articles then stimulated national and regional legislation which 
implemented  those  treaties,  among  others  Directive  2001/29/EC  of  the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmoniza-
tion of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information 
Society ( “Copyright Directive“) in the EU and national laws implementing 
it.
2. CHARACTERISTICS OF DRM SYSTEMS POTENTIALLY 
CONTRIBUTING TO DIGITAL PIRACY
However, neither introduction of such triple protection[12] solved all  the 
problems. Quite the contrary - a number of products failed on the market 
because of the draconian DRM systems[13] and some studies indicate that 
robust DRM systems could indirectly act as a positive driver of digital pir-
acy. 
University of Cambridge researcher Patricia Akester noted in her report 
from 2009 that problems resulting from DRM protection of the content often 
drive individuals to obtain illegal copies, free of DRM[14]. As one of many 
examples, Akester cited a situation in which a blind person who bought a 
legal electronic  copy of the Bible  from Amazon could not utilize  text-to-
speech function. Since Amazon's policy is not to refund eBooks once they've 
been downloaded and the publisher also provided little help referring her 
back to Amazon, the individual in question ended up tracking down an il-
legal copy without the limitation of text-to-speech function[15].
104 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 6:1
Also OECD in its  contribution “Piracy  of Digital  Content” noted that 
DRM may reduce the degree of technical availability and mobility of digital 
products and thus act as a positive driver of piracy[16]. Finally, the most re-
cent study – research carried out by Rice and Duke University called "Music 
Downloads and the Flip Side of Digital Rights Management Protection" - 
used analytical modeling to examine how piracy is influenced by the pres-
ence or absence of DRM restrictions and showed that piracy actually de-
crease when a company allow DRM-free downloads[17].
Therefore, with regard to above findings, following two questions arise: 
What characteristics of DRM systems can make them to act as a positive 
driver of digital piracy? And are those findings mirrored in the recent de-
velopments in the field of DRM systems? The answers to both of these ques-
tions should be found in the following text. 
2.1 THE EASE OF DRM SYSTEMS CIRCUMVENTION AND 
PERFORMANCE PENALTIES OF ROBUST DRM SYSTEMS
The first characteristic important from the point of the view of DRM sys-
tems and digital piracy interrelation is the above mentioned ease of their 
circumvention. 
Vulnerability of the DRM systems lies in the basic structure of function-
ing of the DRM systems and the ease of the crack-solutions distribution. 
DRM systems provide their recipients with ciphertext, the cipher and the 
key, so in  case,  when the recipient  is  also an attacker  “the secret isn’t  a 
secret anymore”[18]. Moreover, even if only a small group of users is able to 
circumvent the DRM system and to transform protected content to an un-
protected form, this transformed content, and also the crack itself, can be 
easily distributed to the less skilled users[19]. Although implementation of 
the robust DRM systems may seem as unavailing, according to some au-
thors it does not invalidate its use to protect the content[20]. The purpose of 
the DRM technologies can lie not in the effort to unbeatably secure the con-
tent, but in the endeavour to make circumvention harder for most of the 
users  and  together  with  the  anti-circumvention  provisions,  make  them 
aware that they will break the law if they would try to circumvent the DRM 
systems[21].  However,  such purpose of DRM systems can be then inter-
preted as endeavour to keep the honest people honest, what is as Cory Doc-
torow aptly wrote - like keeping a tall user tall[22]. 
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The fact that DRM systems are easy to circumvent may be linked to pir-
acy in two ways. Firstly, volume of piracy and pirated works is not influ-
enced by the use of DRM technologies so unprotected versions are still eas-
ily available and represent competition for legal, DRM protected versions. 
Secondly,  when  DRM  implementers  try  to  enhance  efficiency  of  the 
DRM systems (in other words to make the unauthorised use of the protec-
ted content as hardest as possible) it is always the legitimate user who suffer 
from the restrictions in the end. The obvious link can be seen between the 
demand for the pirated copies of the works and the robustness of DRM sys-
tems. Experience with some extremely robust DRM systems suggests that 
when the DRM systems turn up to be draconian also for the legitimate users 
demand for pirated copies increases rapidly. Examples may be seen mainly 
in the fields of the music or game industry. After the release of the game 
Spore protected with the revolutionary strict  DRM system enabling only 
three activations, the game became the most pirated game in the year 2008 
and very probably also in history[23]. The game also got the worst score 
ever in the customer reviews on Amazon.com and overwhelming majority 
of those “one star reviews” were because of the DRM[24]. As another ex-
ample may serve the Coldplay CD “X&Y” protected by robust DRM system 
which among other restrictions made the CD unplayable in some CD play-
ers, DVD players, car CD players, game consoles and also did not enabled 
the conversion of the CD tracks to mp3 format or to copy the CD using 
Macintosh PCs.  Immediately after  the release  users  started to look for  a 
ways how to circumvent the Macrovision DRM system, and in short time 
they succeeded[25]. The issues with robust DRM protection are intertwined 
with another problematic characteristic of the DRM systems and hence with 
the fact that DRM systems often do not enable the exercise of limitations of 
copyright. Simply put, by being algorithmic, DRM systems tend to be less 
flexible[26]what means that limitations are often overlooked[27]. The result 
of the disappointment or frustration[28] caused by the performance penal-
ties connected with the robustness of DRM systems is often the consumer 
rejection  of  the  legitimate  content  protected by DRM technologies.  Such 
situation may subsequently lead to digital piracy, mainly if the only source 
of DRM-free content represents illegal copies of the works. 
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2.2 THE LACK OF INTEROPERABILITY
Interoperability means that “one system can receive, read, interpret, and act 
on the copy protection and rights management information that comes from 
the system of another vendor”[29]. Interoperability is connected with user-
friendliness  of the products[30]  and among other things determines how 
much should a consumer worry that he would not be able to play his legally 
obtained DRM protected songs on his MP3 player, read the DRM protected 
book on his e-book reader or play purchased DRM protected music CD on 
his computer, or in his car. Consumers want to be able to use their legally 
purchased content wherever is needed, on any appropriate device and pos-
sibly to share this content with their friends and family[31], but early DRM 
technologies often stood in the way. For example Sony´s portable player – 
the Music Clip was not able to play even songs in MP3 format because of 
the draconian anti-copying technology used[32].
In fact, non-interoperability often leads directly to the circumvention of 
the DRM systems and also to piracy. Obvious example is Content Scramble 
System (“CSS”)  and the DeCSS computer  program. CSS function  was to 
limit the range of devices which are able to play DVD disks. User was not 
able to play DVD content unless he was using a device that could decode 
the CSS routines. The only operating systems which were able to play thus 
protected DVD discs were only Windows and Macintosh. Linux PCs operat-
ing system was somehow “forgotten” in this, so machines with this operat-
ing system were not able to play content of the DVD. This gave rise to the 
DeCSS program, which disabled the encryption system on a DVD disk by 
cracking the CSS system. DeCSS enabled to DVD content to be played on 
any machine[33]. 
Similar examples can be found in the field of the music industry, both in-
volving Apple´s iTunes FairPlay DRM system. Firstly, there was a case that 
iTunes software was not available for Linux operating system, which led 
again to the circumvention of the Apple´s FairPlay DRM system[34]. Second 
example is connected with the company RealNetworks and their program 
called Harmony. This program was developed on the base of reversed-en-
gineering of the FairPlay DRM system. Purpose of the Harmony was to en-
able users to buy music from Real´s Music Store and play it on the iPods.  
Without Harmony iPod owners could buy and play only the music bought 
through Apple´s iTunes service[35]. Harmony brought more interoperabil-
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ity and freedom for the user, because it offered another source for the iPod 
owners.
As those examples suggest, non-interoperability frequently leads to cir-
cumvention of the DRM systems[36] and force users to seek help and solu-
tions in the field of piracy. It is possible, that consumer´s dissatisfaction will  
foster standardisation and interoperability, but until that will happen, lack 
of  interoperability  of  the  DRM  technologies  will  continue  to  steer  con-
sumers into the arms of piracy.
2.3 SOPHISTICATED DRM SYSTEMS AND THREATS FOR 
USERS´ PRIVACY
Naturally, the content industry recognised above mentioned problems and 
after some time abandoned the idea that massive DRM systems are the new 
panacea to the digital piracy and realised that not the development of the 
robust  technological  protection  measures,  but  the  creation  of  a  business 
model competitive to the P2P file sharing networks did present the proper 
response. Thus, DRM systems implementers refocused from heavy techno-
logical protection to a more refined system of rights management and DRM 
systems became more sophisticated. That gave rise to the heyday of the on-
line retailers like Amazon.com, Apple´s iTunes Store, Rhapsody, Napster, 
Movielink or CinemaNow. Although the new development in the design of 
the DRM systems brought some flexibility and enabled more relaxed usage 
of the content in many ways, it did not rid them of the pitfalls. Some prob-
lems which existed before continue to persist in bigger or smaller scale[37] 
and even some new arose. DRM system implementers still stick to the en-
deavour to keep honest users´ honest but combating piracy is no more the 
solely function of DRM systems and they became inherent part of the busi-
ness models and distribution schemes. Interoperability issues and perform-
ance penalties caused by DRM systems were significantly suppressed by 
new DRM systems, however the interoperability between various DRM sys-
tems is sometimes still negligible; not because of rigidity and robustness of 
DRM technologies, but because a business decision behind. Example can be 
endeavour of Apple´s iTunes DRM technology, which dictated which port-
able players (Apple´s iPods) could be only used to play music files down-
loaded from iTunes.
Thanks to such refocus content industry identified novel content-control 
opportunities, methods of charging providing them with higher revenues or 
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data mining possibilities offered to them by the new design of the DRM sys-
tems integrated in the online services and without hesitation started their 
further development and massive exploitation[38]. 
Privacy is thus nowadays linked to the copyright enforcement as never 
before and privacy issues became the talk of the day with regard to sophist-
icated DRM systems which may, and also very often do, involve the collec-
tion and further processing of vast amount of personal data and enable im-
plementers of DRM systems to closely monitor and track the use of digital 
content and increasingly also the behaviour of users. Various types of in-
formation are collected by means of current DRM systems.  This informa-
tion may relate to identification data often needed for purchase of the con-
tent, such as names, credit cards numbers, age, address, e-mail address, but 
also  to  user´s  hardware,  preferences,  habits  or  access  and  usage 
patterns[39].  The  peril  of  such  data  collection  lies  in  the  various  con-
sequences on privacy; DRM systems may present constant surveillance of 
what people view, listen or read, far beyond the extent what hitherto has 
been usual[40] and adversely affect privacy related interests as autonomy, 
integrity or human dignity[41]. Collected personal data are also often used 
or sold to the third parties for secondary purposes such as targeted advert-
ising or profiling of users´ access and usage patterns or preferences[42]. Us-
age of this data also contributes to limiting access to content and price dis-
crimination[43]. Moreover, it may also have serious implications on demo-
cratic  society  and  expression  of  “non-conformist  opinions  and 
preferences”[44]. Content distributors claim that they need this data as the 
basis  for  their  various  operations  –to  enable  online  purchases  of  the 
content[45], offer “personalized services” in order to simplify the ordering 
or downloading of the content and therefore provide better services,  im-
prove models of traffic and infrastructure of the online services, to more ef-
fectively impose restrictions to the use according to the rules of content us-
age and finally, to combat piracy[46]. Sometimes, it is even proclaimed that 
without tracking of content, usage rights could not be managed[47]. Never-
theless, the main reason of interest lies in the economic value of the data 
and business opportunities offered to the content industry by collection and 
processing of this information. Collected data enable profiling of the users 
and providing  targeted marketing  on  the  base  of  the  information  about 
users´ individual preferences, new methods of charging providing higher 
sales and mainly facilitate price discrimination[48]. Information recorded by 
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the DRM systems offers better image of individuals´ willingness to pay for 
the content to the content industry and thus enable to charge every indi-
vidual with different price set near to the maximum limit of his abilities and 
alacrity[49]. Collected data have also value as an economic asset.
Such development is confirmed by various studies and examples from 
practice.  According  to  the  study  from the  year  2003[50],  carried  out  by 
Burstein, Han and Mulligan from University of California, each of the scru-
tinized services required installation of proxy software and service proxies 
read the index.dat files[51] persistently during every stage of use of the pro-
tected content what may suggest monitoring of users´ browsing habits[52]. 
It also states,  that all  examined DRM systems carried out surveillance of 
protected content usage, mainly in connection with type of the content and 
time, frequency and location of use[53].  Actions taken against Sony BMG 
for its use of the Extended Copy Protection (“XCP”) and MediaMax DRM 
systems were mere confirmation of such practices. XCP system was used on 
some Sony-BMG music CDs which, after the CD was played in the com-
puter,  installed  a  root-kit[54]like  program into  the user´s  computer  hard 
drive[55].  This  software,  presenting  a  security  risk  for  the  computers 
without means to uninstall it, had been covertly gathering data and sending 
them “back  home” to  the  company[56].  Moreover,  everything  was  done 
without users´ knowledge; the end-user license agreement did not contain 
any provision entitling Sony to put software on the users´ computers[57]. 
However the whole revelation of XCP DRM system spying on users´ com-
puters  resulted  in  notable  disapproval,  Sony-BMG continued  to  use  the 
even more hidden, but functionally very similar MediaMax[58] DRM sys-
tem up to its detection[59]- causing, understandably, another scandal. Even 
those public relations hassles did not change content industry approach to 
the privacy issues associated with the use of sophisticated DRM systems. 
More recent Canadian assessment on use of the DRM systems and its im-
plications  for  user´s  privacy[60]  came  up  with  conclusions  that  “pri-
vacy-based criticisms of DRM are well-founded“[61] because during exam-
ination authors  observed tracking of usage and surfing  habits,  generally 
without options to opt-out of unnecessary collection, use and distribution of 
data[62]. Moreover, assessment pointed out a growing trend in DRM sys-
tems that involved internet authentication, surveillance and tying of content 
to  an  online  platform[63].  Surprisingly,  examination  did  also  uncover  a 
number of third party communications which were not explained in corres-
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ponding privacy policies[64]. These conclusions seems to be very close to 
the standard industry practice of nowadays, what can be affirmed by very 
recent cases of privacy threats connected with use of SecuROM Product Ac-
tivation DRM system[65],  Amazon´s  Kindle devices[66]  or new Ubisoft´s 
DRM systems[67]. 
Until consumers would be able to legally obtain copies of works without 
the similar interferences into their privacy, DRM systems remains to be felt 
as an intrusive surveillance of consumer´s lives and thus may lead to ob-
taining pirated content. However, at this point of the development I think 
that risks of current DRM systems for users´ privacy are far more serious 
than the risk that “privacy unfriendliness” will become the most significant 
characteristic making DRM systems to act as a positive driver of digital pir-
acy.
3. CONCLUSION
The piracy of digitized content gave rise to the creation of the Digital Rights 
Management technologies which were supposed to be the decisive techno-
logical response to this undesirable phenomenon. However, their introduc-
tion to practice proved that DRM systems do not represent the panacea for 
digital piracy as was often triumphantly presented. DRM technologies actu-
ally failed in this main aim and transformed to something significantly dif-
ferent. Combating the piracy is not more the main aim of the DRM systems 
and these technologies themselves became an important part of the compet-
ition strategies and business models of many companies. Such shift in logic 
may be linked to the fact that DRM systems inherently include special char-
acteristics which, as reasoning and the examples included in this paper con-
firms, can make them act as a positive driver of digital piracy. The ease of 
DRM systems  circumvention  and performance  penalties  of  robust  DRM 
systems often result to consumer rejection of the legitimate content protec-
ted by DRM technologies  and subsequently to  obtaining easily  available 
pirated copies. Also lack of interoperability may force users of DRM protec-
ted content to seek help and solutions in the field of piracy. Acknowledging 
that and also the fact that DRM systems will never secure absolute protec-
tion of  content,  DRM system implementers  started to use  DRM systems 
more as a tools contributing to the functioning of new distribution channels 
created by them rather than just as a form of copyright protection. Although 
such further development of DRM systems enabled more relaxed use of 
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protected content,  since  DRM systems became more flexible  and less re-
strictive, it may be compared to the stone dropped to the water – the ripples 
spread outward and bestirred waters far away from the immersion, includ-
ing previously quiet waters of the users´ privacy. Amount of data processed 
by DRM systems increased rapidly  what  understandably raises  concerns 
about users´  privacy. Thus,  although adverse effects of above mentioned 
characteristics were partially reduced by introducing of more sophisticated 
DRM systems, privacy issues with regard to current DRM systems usage 
may act as even stronger incentive to obtain pirated copy of desired content. 
Such risk is even bigger taking into account increasing awareness of privacy 
and data protection importance in today´s information society among gen-
eral public. 
Nevertheless, consequences for digital piracy may be seen as a molehill 
rather than a threatening mountain when compared with dangers and con-
sequences of current use of such privacy intruding DRM systems for indi-
viduals. 
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